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Chapter12
Between Minimum and Optimum World Public Order:
An Ethical Path for the Future
Steven R. Ratner*

Among the most signiﬁcant contributions of policy-oriented jurisprudence to our
understanding of international legal process is its identiﬁcation of minimum and optimum world public order as the overarching goals of international law. Minimum
public order in its essence refers to the global state of aﬀairs with limited recourse to
unauthorized violence to solve disputes, while optimum public order is synonymous
with a world in which human dignity is maximally protected.1 These two concepts,
augmented by other pairings now second-nature to us (for example, authority and
control, and myth system and operational code), have also permeated—in the latter
case, germinated in—the scholarship of Michael Reisman. From early writings on the
legitimacy of sanctions against Rhodesia to more recent scholarship about the limits
of self-defense or international criminal law, Reisman has been navigating the shoals
of minimum and optimum public order, clarifying past trends of decision and oﬀering prescriptions for norms and institutions that will advance both of these causes.
The New Haven School did not merely identify two goals; it eﬀectively set priorities for them. A world of minimum public order seemed to be the ﬁrst priority. Indeed, the School’s founders termed it “indispensable to human rights.”2 Such stability
in the international arena would pave the way for states, international organizations,
and civil society to work together to promote human rights.3 Yet the relationship
between these goals could never be that simple for at least two reasons. First, as
*
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Myres S. McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and
World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human
Dignity 410 (1980).
Id. at 236.
In this sense, it is no coincidence that the McDougal/Lasswell project produced a major
volume on minimum world public order in 1961, long before their famous volume on
human rights. See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion
(1961); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 1.
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practical matter, the project of minimum world public order remained and remains
ongoing, so to expect such order—assuming one even knew it when one saw it—before advancing human dignity meant that the latter process would never get oﬀ the
ground. Second, policy-oriented jurisprudence has always recognized that the two
goals might be in tension—that some unauthorized coercion might indeed advance
rather than impede a world order of human dignity.
The linkages and balance between minimum and optimum world public order—
between conﬂict prevention and human rights—thus are central to the New Haven
School. Yet at the same time, the approach does not ask the full range of questions
that need to be considered in knowing how to link public order and human dignity.
How do we know, for example, whether minimum public order always advances optimum public order, and how do we decide which to favor if they conﬂict? To address
these issues we must transcend not only policy-oriented jurisprudence, but law entirely, to the realm of political and moral philosophy.
In that light, this essay seeks to uncover the linkages between minimal and optimal
public order by exploring the ways that political and moral philosophy can contribute
to the project that Reisman and his many colleagues and students seek to advance. In
particular, it highlights various cosmopolitan traditions of global justice and explains
how their analysis converges with and diverges from the approach of the New Haven School. I conclude with some thoughts for further inter-disciplinary scholarship
along these lines.
I. Public Orders in the New Haven School Framework
For McDougal and his successors, law is a process for advancing policy goals in an
authoritative and controlling manner; so once lawyers and other participants can
identify the relevant goals of the community, we can begin a process of prescribing
legal norms to accomplish these goals.4 Minimum and optimum public orders are
the chief policy goals of the international legal process, the standard against which
all outcomes of that process must be measured.5 The basic content of these two concepts was grounded in sociology (Lasswell’s great contribution to the endeavor) and
instantiated in law. Minimum public order derived from the observation that human
beings can best advance their individual and collective goals with minimal coercion
and with a set of authoritative procedures for the deployment of force in situations
when it is necessary. International law had set the basic terms of this process in the
U.N. Charter, and in particular its centralization of the power to make war in the Security Council, coupled with the recognition of the inherent right of individual and
4
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Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, in International Law Essays 355,
368-69 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981).
Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conﬂict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, in
The Methods of International Law 47, 61 (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004).
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collective self-defense.6 The rules of international humanitarian law were also part
of minimum public order. At the same time, the precise rules of international law
that would contribute to such a minimum public order generated signiﬁcant debate,
including most notably over the scope of Article 51.7
The concept of optimum public order also originated in sociology, in that it was
said to be the global order that allowed for maximal production and sharing of the
eight base values identiﬁed early in the work of McDougal and Lasswell: respect,
power, wealth, skill, enlightenment, rectitude, aﬀection, and well-being. The move
from elaborating the processes for promoting minimum public order to elaborating those for advancing optimum public order entailed a great focus on the importance of those base values; how they had been used or abused by governments and
non-state actors to deprive individuals of their enjoyment; and how international law
could be a vehicle for their deployment and their fulﬁlment.
When push came to shove, though, and the two goals seemed to conﬂict, the
New Haven School has oﬀered less than a completely satisfactory answer. On the
one hand, it has recognized—and insisted that the U.N. Charter did too—that human rights was just as important a goal for public order as prevention of conﬂict,
oﬀering a quick riposte to those governmental and scholarly advocates of traditional
sovereignty-at-all-costs. Indeed, Reisman, in his controversial defense of the Panama
invasion in 1989, presciently deﬁned sovereignty as inextricably linked with human
rights, a position that would later receive ringing endorsement from a U.N. SecretaryGeneral and at least a grudging acknowledgment by heads of state.8 This position led
to his belief in a limited right of humanitarian intervention not only as lex lata but as
de lege ferenda as a way of deterring coups d’etats against democratic governments.9
On the other hand, the New Haven School’s critical emphasis on context in gauging both the existing expectations of international actors and projecting future policies at times left us wondering whether more general recommendations could be
made. Thus, in discussing the legality of amnesties, Wiessner and Willard note that
the authority for amnesties “is context-dependent, it is never known, with speciﬁcity,
in advance of a particular problem.”10 Reisman’s recognition of the legality of a limited
right of humanitarian intervention by states acting without a Security Council man6
7
8

9

10

U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 41, 42, 51.
For various academic views, see Albrecht Randelzoﬀer, Article 51, in The Charter of
the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 797 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d. ed. 2002).
W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866 (1990); The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 129 ,
U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, ¶ 38,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 15, 2005).
W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 794 (1995); see also W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become
Victims: Preventing and Arresting Mass Murder, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 57 (20072008) (reliance on Genocide Convention for obligation to prevent atrocities).
Wiessner & Willard, supra note 5, at 60.

197

II Theory About Making and Applying Law

198

date and his embrace of this possibility to preserve democracies was followed after
the Iraq invasion with a warning about the dangers of regime change.11 And the New
Haven School’s emphasis on human rights translated into support for humanitarian
intervention to protect the Ibos in Nigeria, but not for secession in Bosnia.12
My point is not that these judgments are wrong—on the contrary, the analysis of
context is generally so astute that the recommendations regarding future directions
for the law are always worth considering very seriously. But the inherently sociological approach of the New Haven School—one might call it “fact-based international
law”—that is its great strength can also at times be a weakness. I do not mean a weakness in the way that European doctrinalists have (very wrongly) criticized it—that it
is not suﬃciently binary and elides law observance and law violation.13 But it can be
a shortcoming for those seeking more generalized guidance on the tradeoﬀ between
minimum public order and optimum public order. Without denying the importance
of close scrutiny of the participants, perspectives, situations, base values, and strategies relevant to a particular set of competing claims, we can ask whether it is not
possible to ﬁnd some overarching principles of how international actors ought to behave that will supplement the sociological approach. At a certain point international
actors making policy choices should be—or, as a descriptive matter of the process of
authoritative decision, simply will be—guided by moral considerations as well.
II. From Social Process to Ethics
A. Complementary Inquiries
Although the New Haven School never denied the role of morality in the development of international law—certainly human dignity is an inherently moral concept—
it preferred to see morality through a more anthropological lens as simply the demands of the community relating to certain values.14 International law would reﬂect
morality because it reﬂected the demands of the community as determined by their
base values. Any other sort of theorizing for law was defective because it lacked social context.15 But those demands, even for a concept as morally signiﬁcant as human
dignity, cannot be transformed into legal norms, for minimum and optimum public order are simply too general as concepts to guide a process of prescription. We
need instead to weigh those demands against each other and ultimately make critical
11
12

13

14
15

W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 Am. J. Int’l
L. 516 (2004).
Compare Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 167 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973),
with Remarks by W. Michael Reisman, 1993 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 258-59.
See, e.g., Gilbert Guillaume, Preface, 58 Me. L. Rev. 281 (2006). For a response, see Steven
Ratner, Jeﬀrey Dunoﬀ & David Wippman, ASIL President’s Column, July 6, 2007, http://
www.asil.org/ilpost/president/pres070706.html.
See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 1, at 3-13.
See infra note 41 on their reactions to Rawls’s project.
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choices in the prescription of law. This process requires some intervening stage of
moral scrutiny.
In this light, the central moral inquiry that complements the sociological approach
and contributes to its key task of devising strategies for achieving optimum public
order is the following: what ethical duties do we have to promote the human dignity
of other individuals on the planet, both those on our territory and those abroad? Deriving these moral duties of individuals—and eventually moral duties on the state—is
a critical component to prescribing law for states, as moral duties remain an important inspiration for legal rights and duties. This linkage of legal rules to moral rules
remains the case, even though, as both positivists and legal realists (including policyoriented jurisprudence) agree, what we consider as law is a matter of social fact.16
Yet the question of the moral duties owed by the state to individuals is not one that
lawyers alone can answer, for that is not what lawyers normally do. Lawyers can identify expectations, shape future preferences, devise and invoke the processes of institutions, and do many other things, but they rarely engage in rigorous ethical inquiry
underlying the observational standpoint that they bring to the table. But that does
not make ethics irrelevant to the lawyer. For lawyers are not mere engineers, tinkering with this institutional arrangement or that to advance some client’s interests. As
Christian Reus-Smit writes, “international law [is] a crucial site within international
society for the negotiation of practical and purposive norms.”17 So it is very much the
business of international lawyers to ask ethical questions, because the arrangements
they construct will reﬂect the ethical perspectives of the various participants, including the lawyers themselves.
– As we consider these duties, we will be able to ask and answer questions about
international law that policy-oriented jurisprudence also seeks to answer:
– What action is required, permitted, or prohibited, to carry out those duties?
– If action is required or permitted, then who must or should act to carry out
those duties?
– If those designated to act fail to do so, then what shall be the consequences?
The duties and questions that ﬂow from them are also at the core of the issues so
central to Reisman’s scholarship: humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to
protect, self-defense, regime change, self-determination, and international humani-

16

17

See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 198-207 (1961); Peter Cane, Responsibility
in Law and Morality 12-16 (2002). Morality, even of a purely utilitarian nature, is not
the only justiﬁcation for particular legal rules, as, for example, problems of coordination
rather than cooperation may produce rules that are not morally superior to other proposals but are nonetheless superior to no rule. On the role of moral views in judging, see
Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 94, 240-41 (2008).
Christian Reus-Smit, Society, Power, and Ethics, in The Politics of International
Law 272, 278 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); see also Kok-Chor Tan, International
Toleration: Rawlsian vs. Cosmopolitan, 18 Leiden J. Int’l L. 685, 686-87 (2005) (“[N]
ormative political philosophy can identify the fundamental norms that our global legal
institutions should reﬂect.”).
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tarian law. Traditional international law is not oblivious to these sorts of questions,
but the static concepts of opposability or obligations erga omnes (the latter of which
human rights are said to be part) does not capture the myriad possible duties that
participants in the international legal process may owe each other.
B. International Justice and the Cosmopolitan Project
Fundamentally, the moral inquiries decisionmakers need to make involve a search
for justice at the global level. Philosophers interested in global justice ask whether,
and if so, what sort of, duties are owed by various international actors to each other. These questions transcend interpersonal ethics by asking not just how humans
should behave to each other, but how we can construct institutions at a global level
that advance a certain understanding of those interpersonal duties.18 Work on global
justice is as old as the classic philosophers, but has coalesced in recent years around
essentially three approaches: (1) philosophers who see justice as a uniquely intrastate
phenomenon and remain sceptical of global justice; (2) those who see justice in terms
of a set of relationships and structures based on the idea of communities (for example, states or peoples) as the sole or key units of moral concern—communitarians;
and (3) those who see justice in terms of a set of relationships and structures based
on the notion of individuals as the sole or key unit of moral concern—cosmopolitans.
Each of these positions now has a vast literature to accompany it, and each clearly
maintains relevance for international law.
Among the sceptics of international justice, the views vary from some political
scientists who simply see no role for morality in international aﬀairs to more subtle
approaches that accept that international society should be governed by some rules
but refuse to regard those as part of the project of justice. Thus, for instance, Thomas
Nagel believes that duties of justice—in particular economic justice—based on equal
regard for our fellow human beings can only arise in “a strong and coercively imposed political community,” which the international system clearly is not.19 At the
same time, he acknowledges that some aspects of justice, such as basic human rights,
do not depend on such associations, so a “minimal humanitarian morality” means
that outsiders should be concerned about how a state treats its citizens.20 In Rawlsian terms, even if there is not at the international level an overlapping consensus
on a political conception of justice, and interstate relations are instead based on a
mere modus vivendi, it is still possible for states or individuals to have duties toward
each other, for states to enter into agreements, and for law to emerge.21 But because
these scholars are mostly concerned with explaining why the dignity of the individual
cannot be the basis for elaborating duties and justice at the international level, their

18
19
20
21

See Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48, 50-52 (1992)
(contrasting interactional and institutional conceptions of morality and justice).
Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 113, 133 (2005).
Id. at 126-27, 130-31.
See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 192-95 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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ability to contribute to the challenges of moving from minimum to optimum world
public order is limited.
Communitarians bring somewhat more to the table insofar as they do not completely deny the possibility of some concept of international justice; they merely see it
in terms of respect for various communities. Indeed, whether in the work of Michael
Walzer or even Rawls’s attempt to derive a liberal foreign policy of just peoples in The
Law of Peoples, communitarians do not give short shrift to individual human dignity;
they rather see that dignity as deﬁned by the community itself. For them, justice is
about allowing for signiﬁcant degree of toleration of diversity in order to allow communities to ﬂourish and individuals to realize their goals in them. It is, in Walzer’s
terminology, at best a thin conception of justice, to be contrasted with the thick notion that prevails within a community.22 Fundamentally they are willing to give a great
deal of discretion to communities to organize themselves as they see ﬁt, although
they do set some limits when it comes to violations of the most basic human rights.
Of the three approaches, cosmopolitanism has most directly engaged the possibility of international justice.23 Cosmopolitan scholars are committed to justice based
on the equal moral concern for individuals everywhere, regardless of whether the
individual is in one’s community or in another community. Human beings qua individuals, not as members of communities, are the sole or at least fundamental unit
of moral concern. Yet various views of cosmopolitanism emanate from this agreed
starting point. Philosophers disagree about the duties that ﬂow from valuing all individuals equally—and in particular the source and range of our duties to those with
whom we have special relationships compared to our duties to all people generally.
Strong cosmopolitans believe in equal regard for all persons in determining all duties;
any special treatment we give to those in special relationships with us (for example,
co-nationals) is completely derivative of that equal worth and cannot be justiﬁed
based on the relationship itself. Weak or moderate cosmopolitans argue that we have
both general duties to all persons in the planet as well as special duties to those in certain relationships to us that are of independent moral signiﬁcance; the latter, towards
families or co-nationals, need not be derivative of general duties.24
Indeed, we might recharacterize all of the above positions as falling along a spectrum in responding to the fundamental question put by Brian Barry (himself a strong
cosmopolitan): “[G]iven a world that is made up of states, what is the morally permis-

22
23

24

See Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad,
at xi (1994).
As Miller writes, “‘[c]osmopolitan’ is probably now the preferred self-description of most
political philosophers who write about global justice.” David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice 23 (2007).
See Samuel Scheffler, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, in Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought 111, 11416 (2001). For a somewhat diﬀerent deﬁnition of strong vs. weak cosmopolitanism, see
Miller, supra note 23, at 27-31 (distinguishing between insistence on equal treatment of
all persons and equal value to all persons).
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sible range of diversity among them?” 25 To rephrase somewhat, how much global diversity—in terms of various conceptions of and respect for human dignity—is consistent with global justice?26 Of the three camps I have identiﬁed, the ﬁrst would reject
the premise of the question; communitarians might accept the possibility of global
justice but would argue that signiﬁcant diversity, up to some limits, is at its core;
and the third group would argue that global justice as a substantive concept requires
limits on diversity, with the greater limits among the strong cosmopolitans (who, for
example, tend to favor major wealth redistribution to address global inequalities).27
These theorists are also asking, fundamentally, whether we have one international
community or multiple communities, and why.28
In addition to their focus on the limits of diversity, cosmopolitan approaches are
characterized by the centrality of the concept of impartiality to their reasoning. In
particular, a cosmopolitan morality is “based on an impartial consideration of the
claims of each person who would be aﬀected by our choices.”29 Cosmopolitans often argue over which sorts of duties at the international level can be defended as
impartial. As a general matter, weak cosmopolitans accept the possibility, or aﬃrmatively argue, that special relationships, such as those between nationals, can alone
give rise to special duties. Strong cosmopolitans are much less willing to take this
route, preferring that all special duties be derivative of the idea of equal treatment of
all individuals. Both thus regard their approaches as impartial but diﬀer on the basis
for grounding disparate treatment. 30 Indeed, they may end up agreeing on the scope
of some duties, as weak cosmopolitans do not insist that all special relationships give
rise to special duties, and strong cosmopolitans may see certain special duties as fully
justiﬁed based on the idea of equal treatment of the individual.
Lastly, cosmopolitans diﬀer not only in their views on special duties, but also in
terms of the methodology for deriving principles of justice from the equal dignity of
all individuals across the planet. Utilitarians such as Peter Singer will consider the
sum total of human welfare with all individuals counted equally;31 deontologists such
25

26
27
28
29
30

31

Brian Barry, International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, in International
Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives 144, 154 (David R. Mapel & Terry Nardin
eds., 1998).
Cf. Tan, supra note 17, at 686.
As an example of the latter, see Barry, supra note 25.
Beyond philosophy, the so-called English School of International Relations, which is built
on the idea of an international society, shares certain ideas of cosmopolitans.
Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System, in Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives 119, 124-25 (Chris Brown ed., 1994).
See Christopher Heath Wellman, Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory: Is There
Magic in the Pronoun ‘My’?, 110 Ethics 537 (2000) (distinguishing between “reductionist” and “associativist” (or “nonreductionist”)); Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality
191-95 (1995); Marcia Baron, Impartiality and Friendship, 101 Ethics 836 (1991) (on different levels of impartiality); cf. David Miller, On Nationality 53-55 (1995) (ﬁnding
impartiality discussion confusing).
See, e.g., Peter Singer, Famine, Aﬄuence, and Morality, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 229 (1972).
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as Allen Buchanan will start from premises of duties and rights;32 and contractarians
such as Thomas Pogge will ask what sort of system would be agreed by a group of
equally valued individuals.33 Each of these approaches can yield vastly diﬀerent conceptions of international justice, and each can create sharply contrasting visions of
the balance between minimum and optimum public order.
III. International Justice, Cosmopolitanism, and Policy-Oriented
Jurisprudence—Convergences and Divergences
The preceding brief elaboration of approaches to international justice suggests the
possibilities for many linkages between theories of international justice and international law. As noted above, understanding the scope of our moral duties to other
individuals is a prerequisite for devising the requisite legal rights, duties, and responsibilities for promoting public order. Of the three approaches, cosmopolitanism’s direct engagement with international justice per se and its focus on the equal worth
of the individual resonates most closely with the project of the New Haven School.
Both cosmopolitanism and the policy-oriented approach seek to develop the criteria, rules, and institutions for a public order based on human dignity, even as the
former derives these from ﬁrst principles of morality and the latter from sociological observations. At the same time, policy-oriented jurisprudence does not demand
(although it does not preclude) the sort of commitments that the strong version of
cosmopolitanism places upon both individuals and states to guarantee various aspects of human dignity. Indeed, communitarian themes surface at times in Reisman’s
scholarship, notably his concern about sovereignty belonging to the people of a state
(although this is not inconsistent with a cosmopolitan vision either).34
The two key themes of diversity and impartiality discussed above also resonate
with international lawyers, and the New Haven School’s search for optimum public
order in particular. First, issues of diversity and toleration so central to international
justice are also essential to the project of international law. As Kok-Chor Tan writes,
“in so far as we hope that international law does reﬂect our justice-based commitments, clarifying the limits of toleration can help to identify for us the range of international legal arrangements that can be described as just.”35 International lawyers
constantly inquire as to whether new areas should be subject to global (or regional)
regulation, and how much that regulation should preserve the ﬂexibility of individual
states to pursue their policy ends as they see ﬁt. Second, cosmopolitans’ search for
an impartial justiﬁcation for moral duties is similar to the project of lawyers seeking
to develop new norms. A duty enmeshed in the rule of law must be ultimately justiﬁable as impartial and treat all persons or states equally in some sense. Refraining from
32
33
34
35

See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 85-98 (2004).
See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989).
See Reisman, supra note 8, at 872 (sovereignty as “the continuing capacity of a population
freely to express and eﬀect choices about the identities and policies of its governors”).
Tan, supra note 17, at 686.
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playing favorites does not require equal treatment for all states and individuals—but
it does mean that they be treated as equals.36 So for those seeking a just world order
grounded in law and institutions, partialist justiﬁcations will not pass muster.
At the same time, the targets of inquiry of the international justice and policyoriented projects are not identical in several important respects. First, they diﬀer
sharply in their approach to the phenomenon of state power and its disparities. The
New Haven School sees the diverse power of states, international organizations, and
other actors as a variable that must be considered front and center as both a constraint upon, and instrument for, the promotion of human dignity; as Reisman writes,
“lawful acts, to be such, will require a minimum degree of eﬀectiveness.”37 Policy-oriented scholars disagree signiﬁcantly on diﬀerent aspects of the relationship between
authority and control, including the role of centralized mechanisms of enforcement
compared to individual state action, but still see power as essential to law’s eﬀectiveness and ultimately its existence.38 Cosmopolitans (and many other philosophers as
well) tend to see norms and law in opposition to power (just like political realists
reject the relevance of morality in a world governed by power). Theorizing seeks to
ﬁnd the grounds by which states or international institutions can exercise political
power rather than take that power as a given.39 At the same time, international justice theorists often concede power’s importance in making particular recommendations for non-ideal theory. Andrew Hurrell, of the English School of political science,
which shares certain basic premises of cosmopolitanism, expresses both the distaste
for power and the ultimate need to engage with it when he writes, “the aspirations
of [a] normatively ambitious international society remain deeply contaminated by
power and … the normative theorist can only ignore the persistence of this structural
contamination at the cost of idealization.”40
Second, scholars in the policy-oriented perspective (including this author) have
tended to give far less attention to problems of global distributive justice than philosophers. The latter’s fascination from this issue stems from the vast debate surround-

36
37

38

39
40

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227 (1977).
W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in International Law Essays,
supra note 4, at 1, 7; see also W. Michael Reisman, On the Causes of Uncertainty and
Volatility in International Law, in The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity 33,
48 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008) (“Normative arrangements require power
to support and implement them.”).
For insightful comparisons between McDougal and Falk in this regard, see Rosalyn Higgins, Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International Law, 23 Int’l
Org. 914 (1969) (reviewing Richard A. Falk, A Legal Order in a Violent World
(1968)). For Higgins’s further views, see Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process:
International Law and How We Use It 3-7 (1995).
See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 32, at 299-327.
Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, in
States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries 275, 284 (Allen Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003).
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ing the possibilities for extending Rawls’s diﬀerence principle from A Theory of Justice to the international realm. The subject has dominated ethical thinking regarding
international relations for thirty years, with strong cosmopolitan scholars taking the
lead in arguing for global distributive justice. Nothing in the framework of the New
Haven School presents an obstacle to considering problems of distributive justice,
even if McDougal was highly critical of Rawls’s philosophical and thus anti-empirical
approach.41 Whether as a result of the hostility of the founders of policy-oriented
jurisprudence or the general reluctance of U.S. legal scholars to discuss questions
of economic justice (as opposed to narrower questions of the contours of economic
and social rights set forth in treaties), the gap between the New Haven School and
international justice theorists remains signiﬁcant on this front.
Third, and most critically, cosmopolitan scholars spend a great deal of their efforts, whether in debates between the weak and the strong versions, or in their debates with communitarians, on the underlying basis for the idea of an international
community. For justice is viewed by many philosophers as a concept that governs
those within some kind of community, whereas relations based on mutual interest
alone—a modus vivendi—cannot ground duties of justice (though they can ground
other duties). Thus, signiﬁcant argumentation takes place on the question of whether,
and if so what sort of, interactions among states and individuals at the global level
can create the international equivalent of Rawls’s basic structure and whether such a
structure is needed to generate duties of international justice.42 The policy-oriented
school, like other approaches to international law, assumes the existence of some
kind of international community—the world community—by virtue of the shared interests and interactions of global actors, factors that might fall short for philosophers
as a basis for duties of justice.43 International lawyers would not deny that other communities exist alongside the global community and thus see no need to question the
idea of special duties to one’s co-nationals. In this sense, international law as a ﬁeld is
consistent with a moderately cosmopolitan vision of international justice insofar as
it does not actively oppose the idea of national ties per se as creating special duties.
This diﬀerence in focus is indeed precisely wherein the advantage of ethical inquiry lies for international law. For international law’s assumption of—rather than
an argument for—an international community, and the resultant lack of interest in
addressing why we should have international duties to others, perpetuates the lack of
guidance on moving from minimum to optimum public order. Each diﬀerent ethical
theory of the origin, nature, and scope of international duties will aﬀect the choices
we make proposing international duties that assist us in navigating between mini41
42

43

McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 1, at 454 n.9, 459-60 n.23.
For example, Charles Beitz originally said that trade alone could create a community in
which each member owed the others duties of justice, but later backtracked on this idea.
Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. Phil. 591, 595 (1983);
see also Buchanan, supra note 32, at 83-85.
The New Haven School founders did not quite assume its existence, but regarded it as an
anthropological fact rather than a moral question. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen,
supra note 1, at 88.
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mum and optimum public order. To demonstrate this necessity and the consequences for international law of diﬀerent approaches to deriving moral duties, I now turn
to an area of law not extensively considered by the policy-oriented school but highly
important in contemporary international law.
IV. Fitting Ethics In: The Case of Extraterritorial Duties Regarding
Human Rights
The scope of a state’s duties under international human rights law to those persons
not on its territory has lately become one of the key issues in international law. From
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights over NATO action over
Belgrade or in Iraq, to the conduct of the United States toward those it has captured
abroad—or targeted for killing—in the name of combating terrorism, to Israel’s construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank, those harmed by the conduct of
governments beyond their territory have invoked human rights law to bolster their
claims and seek redress. Human rights NGOs and many scholars, backed by the views
of some U.N. bodies as well as the International Court of Justice, have argued for the
extraterritorial application of various treaties; states, led by the United States in numerous public statements, have been far more reticent, with the European Court of
Human Rights treading carefully between the two.44 The lines are essentially drawn
between those who see the corpus of human rights law, and thus states’ duties under
it, as extending to all situations when a state infringes upon a human right and those
who view both the treaties and custom as limiting the scope of a state’s obligations to
those on its territory.
Each of the many methods of international law will have its approach to addressing this important problem.45 Positivists will focus on principles of interpretation of
treaties and black-letter rules for the derivation of custom. Policy-oriented jurisprudence’s comparative advantage lies in its explicit consideration of all the contextual
factors related to this issue, so that observers and policymakers are able to see the
full complexity of the problem. Their conclusions would likely highlight the reasons
states may have originally agreed on a territorial approach to human rights; the various ways in which states may act beyond their borders; the practical eﬀect on standards of human dignity of extending such duties extraterritorially; the consequences
for interstate relations and minimum public order if states were assumed to have
various duties to those beyond their borders; and the consequences for the human
rights enforcement if the state was held to have duties beyond its borders. Such a
careful appraisal could be accompanied by prescriptions for how to interpret existing treaties as well as the directions for future law development. As the New Haven
School has recognized, it is likely that each evaluation of the problem and solution
will be inﬂuenced by the observational standpoint of the relevant participant. So it
44
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should not surprise us that states and human rights NGOs disagree on the meaning
of texts and custom.
But a richer analysis of the problem requires that we return to the original question above—what are our moral duties to individuals at home and abroad—with a
particular focus on the permissible bases on which a state may distinguish its duties
among various classes of individuals. What, in essence, are the general duties of a
state—owed to all individuals—in the area of human rights, and what and toward
whom are its special duties, owed only to some? Many philosophers would accept
that individuals in state A have some duties to those in state B, but they would disagree on the grounding of those duties, whether they are duties of justice or some
other kind of duties, and the consequences that ﬂow from such duties for state A
itself in its relations with state B.
Indeed, when viewed from the perspective of general and special duties, it becomes clear that the lawyer’s problem of extraterritorial duties related to human
rights is actually part of a broader issue about two sets of duties. Most lawyers are really only considering one of them, while philosophers have only been considering the
other. When lawyers talk about extraterritoriality of human rights obligations, they
are concerned with (1) the duties triggered when a state decides for whatever reason to
take action beyond its borders. These duties include the duty to refrain from torture
or disappearances when undertaking counter-terrorism operations, or to guarantee
certain rights to people under occupation. Philosophers have, however, focussed on
a diﬀerent set of extraterritorial duties—namely (2) the duties by a state to initiate
action outside its borders to protect or assist persons abroad. These obligations range
from duties to aid foreigners in attaining a decent diet to duties to help them in
overthrowing a genocidal regime.46 Whereas the ﬁrst focuses on the obligations on a
state to protect individuals once it acts abroad, the second set of duties addresses the
moral trigger for action to help individuals abroad in the ﬁrst place.47 Lawyers have
certainly addressed the second question, but generally as a separate inquiry—in the
doctrinal boxes of jus ad bellum or non-intervention—rather than part of the problematique of extraterritorial human rights duties.48 But they ultimately come back to
the scope of the duties of the state to foreigners and thus cannot be separated. In that
light, because philosophy has asked what I consider the more fundamental questions
about (at least some) extraterritorial duties, I here examine their contribution to the
overall debate over extraterritorial duties related to human rights.
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I appreciate this critical distinction from Allen Buchanan.
As discussed below, these do not map onto the distinction between so-called positive and
negative duties.
One exception would be work on the territorial scope of a state’s duty to respect various economic, social, and cultural rights, which address questions about the duty to act
abroad through the lens of extraterritorial human rights protections.
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Philosophical approaches sceptical of global moral duties could take a number of
positions about extraterritorial duties related to human rights. One view would emphasize the lack of one international community and argue that at best states co-exist
in a state of modus vivendi. So whatever duties best preserve that modus vivendi are
worth pursuing and those that undermine it are not. The modus vivendi, rather than
any conception of international justice, undergirds international law’s duties that
states not use force against each other and not intervene in each other’s internal affairs. While they might accept that individuals have moral duties to those abroad, any
duty of a state to those abroad must not undermine those two key inter-state duties
and the modus vivendi.
Thus, duties by one state to ensure that those abroad gain their right to vote or
their right to food—the second category above—would be rejected, unless perhaps
if such duties were conditioned upon a request of the host state. Humanitarian intervention would seem to be generally oﬀ limits. On the other hand, they might well
accept that a state cannot impinge on the human rights of individuals in another
state when acting abroad—the ﬁrst category above—since it would upset the modus
vivendi. They might argue that such a duty would not apply if the target state itself
consented to those violations, although perhaps consent would not aﬀect the most
basic rights against ill-treatment. Such a view of the two sets of duties is consistent
with the overall goal of preserving the modus vivendi. It also views human rights
obligations as essentially interstate; it downplays the idea that individuals are themselves the holders of human rights to whom states have a duty.49
B. Communitarianism
Communitarians would also be unwilling to envisage too many extraterritorial duties by states regarding human rights. But their reason is not the need to preserve
the modus vivendi, but to preserve the autonomy of other communities. Because
communities deﬁne individuals and their dignity, their autonomy deserves signiﬁcant respect. The state will thus have numerous duties to those on its territory; as
Walzer says, an individual’s “right to place” means that “[t]he state owes something
to its inhabitants simply, without reference to their collective or national identity.”50
Indeed, his emphasis on territoriality extends to a claim that the state has a duty to
grant political asylum to oppressed people from other lands who make it to the state,
though he cautions against extending this principle to requiring the grant of asylum
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On the distinction between the duties of beneﬁciaries of rights vs. rightsholders, see
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to all those oppressed abroad as the state “might be overwhelmed.”51 But our moral
duties to individuals abroad are limited by the need to respect the autonomy of communities. As a result, communitarians might well favor a duty of the second kind to
aid states that are victims of conquest by other states (or are likely to be) and have
thus lost their autonomy; but they would refrain from any duty to object to a state’s
internal practices short of gross human rights violations.52
Rawls adopts a similar position in The Law of Peoples with his emphasis on the
need for liberal states not merely to respect each other, but also to respect other
“well-ordered peoples,” by which he means so-called decent hierarchical societies, or
semi-authoritarian states that respect the most elementary of human rights and act
responsibly abroad.53 At the same time, with respect to societies that are not in these
two categories, he advocates stronger extraterritorial duties. He argues that “[w]ellordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies,” namely those communities
that “lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and,
often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered.”54 Rawls
himself focuses on the need for economic assistance to get these states to the point of
being well-ordered. But he seems reluctant to argue for further interference in their
internal aﬀairs, since the goal, as for Walzer, is “the political autonomy of free and
equal liberal and decent peoples.”55
The skeptics and the communitarians thus diﬀer on the scope of the duty to act ab
initio (the second set of duties above). Part of this diﬀerence stems from a willingness
by the latter to engage with the question of whether the government really speaks
on behalf of the community at all and thus whether its consent is necessary and sufﬁcient to preserve the community’s autonomy, a question that those concerned with
preserving a modus vivendi among states would not ﬁnd relevant. At the same time,
they might well agree on that a state has signiﬁcant duties in the ﬁrst category above,
that is, when it acts abroad—that it cannot then violate the rights of persons inside
another community.
Some communitarian approaches would even question the morality of the status
quo in human rights law, under which a state’s duties to individuals apply to all on its
territory, with few duties limited to citizens alone.56 Andrew Mason oﬀers his own
51
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version of a state’s duties based on the idea of citizenship as an intrinsically valuable
good. He rejects cosmopolitan stances (in particular those of Robert Goodin and
Allen Gewirth) that justify duties only to residents, but he also rejects theories that
limit duties only to members of the nation, both of which are distinct from citizens.57
His and others’ embrace of the need to justify special duties to compatriots is based
on their perceived need to ﬁnd a moral basis for the common-sense pull of ties based
on citizenry. Presumably their only response to the existing legal order under international human rights law, which is territorially based, is to ﬁnd it irrational or immoral. For one who questions whether a state has duties to all those on its territory,
the notion of extraterritorial duties would be, in a sense, doubly absurd.
C. Cosmopolitanism
Among cosmopolitan approaches more open to the idea of global duties based on the
equal worth of the individual, the optimal scope of extraterritorial duties would vary
across and within diﬀerent versions of cosmopolitanism. A strong cosmopolitan perspective based on a utilitarian calculation, such as Singer’s, would weigh the utility to
all individuals of requiring states to guarantee various human rights abroad against the
costs. He might ﬁnd the beneﬁts to individuals outweigh the costs with respect to some
duties related to human rights, for example, the duty to provide food to the needy.58
Robert Goodin, in an inﬂuential article, oﬀered a richer explanation for the special
duty of a state to its residents that is consistent with strong cosmopolitanism.59 All
duties regarding others are general, but states represent an eﬃcient way of dividing
up the globe to allocate who should carry out those duties. States with eﬀective control over individuals, rather than some other state, have special duties to those people
because they are in the best position to ensure respect for their rights. Thus, for example, the control by the Japanese government over Japanese territory puts it in the
best position to ensure that criminal defendants there receive procedural guarantees.
(This position can also be contested; perhaps eﬀective control over a population does
not put the state in the best position to guarantee all rights, for example, in the case
of impoverished states.) But at least as an initial matter, we will place the duties to
protect human rights only on the territorial states. Goodin then argues that one state
does another harm when it “inﬂict[s] injuries on their [that is, the latter’s] citizens,”
but “ordinarily no state has any claim against other states for positive assistance in
promoting its own citizens’ interests.”60
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Goodin thus draws on the distinction between a state’s negative duties, that is, not
to impinge on the negative rights of individuals (for example, not to torture foreigners) and its positive duties, that is, to guarantee positive rights such as the right to
food, suggesting that a state’s negative but not positive duties are extraterritorial.61
The notion resembles international law’s understanding that territorial sovereignty
imposes duties on a state not to cause harm to other states (and their nationals)
on that territory or abroad—a point developed by Reisman in discussing (two years
before September 11) a state’s duties regarding terrorists on its territory.62 Territorial
sovereignty per se does not impose duties to aid other states (although it may impose
certain positive duties of the state toward its own citizens).
At the same time, this approach to duties to those abroad has ﬂaws as a matter of
both law and ethics. Legally, the line between positive and negative obligations is not
ﬁrm: the (positive) duty to provide a fair trial is part of a (negative) duty not to treat
someone arbitrarily; and the (negative) duty not to torture requires the carrying out
of the (positive) duty to train police. Philosophically, it is not clear that negative duties are more important, or that it is more realistic to expect individuals and states to
act on negative duties but not positive ones. Singer and Thomas Pogge, for example,
have argued that our and our state’s duty to help the starving person around the globe
is no less important than our state’s duty not to conduct an extraterritorial execution. Pogge in particular emphasizes that each of us as individuals are responsible for
global inequities that he claims have been caused by the international institutions we
have set up.63 From this perspective, Goodin’s division of labour is itself a function of
the resources of international institutions; robust international organizations could
enable states to have or act on positive obligations as well. This stronger cosmopolitanism has little room for the positive/negative duties mentioned by Goodin.
Goodin, like most philosophers, focuses on the second set of duties noted earlier,
that is, duties when to act abroad. As for the lawyer’s concern with duties triggered
when a state acts abroad, the negative duties he favors would seem to apply a fortiori
when a state is harming another state’s citizens on the latter’s territory, suggesting
at least some signiﬁcant extraterritorial duties of this kind. Indeed, legal scholars
have adopted a similar line for determining which duties regarding human rights a
state assumes when it acts extraterritorially.64 However, Goodin’s initial opposition
to positive duties to act abroad need not translate into a similar opposition to such
duties once the state acts abroad. Thus, for instance, it would be reasonable to claim
61
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that states lack a duty to aid other states as a general matter and still accept that, when
a state acts abroad (for example, the United States in invading Iraq), that action triggers certain positive duties to aid the citizens of that country. From his perspective
in which control over territory is critical for determining a state’s duties, a state that
occupies foreign territory would likely have various positive duties to aid the population.
David Miller engages the issue from the perspective of a weak cosmopolitan approach that accepts the intrinsic value of relationships among co-nationals and advocates both special duties to nationals and general duties to others. He breaks down
our duties regarding others’ human rights into four component duties: (1) refraining
from infringing rights; (2) securing rights of those we are responsible to protect;
(3) preventing violations by others; and (4) securing rights of others when those responsible for securing them do not do so.65 This maps in part onto the distinction
in human rights law among the duty to respect (Miller’s ﬁrst duty), the duty to protect (Miller’s third duty), and the duty to fulﬁl (Miller’s second duty).66 Miller then
argues that the scope of duties to those abroad vs. co-nationals should vary both in
terms of the importance of the duty and the primary bearer of the duty. He ultimately
concludes that we, and presumably our state, have equal duties to our own and to
foreigners—that is, general duties—when it comes to duty (1) and stronger duties to
co-nationals regarding duties (3) and (4), with the ramiﬁcations for duty (2) depending upon whether indeed we have responsibilities to those abroad for certain rights
as opposed to others.
Miller’s argument for general duties for category 1 but not the other categories
is, like Goodin’s, based on the negative/positive duty distinction and thus has similar shortcomings.67 Yet, like Goodin, Miller’s preference for nationals with regard to
some duties ((2) and (3) in his scheme) need not apply in some situations when a state
acts abroad, for in some of these case, notably occupation, the state does have the
responsibility to protect foreigners. Miller, then, helps show how a weak cosmopolitan approach can provide a conceptual framework for determining the extraterritorial scope of human rights. He also directly addresses the considerations in deciding
which states should assume responsibilities if more than one have certain duties.68
D. Lessons and Linkages
The illustrations above cannot reﬂect the full arguments of each of the positions, and
indeed they are based on presumptive extensions of existing positions, as philoso65
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phers have focussed on the second set of duties abroad and not oﬀered a sustained,
head-on treatment of extraterritorial duties in the area of human rights as lawyers
understand that question (that is, the ﬁrst category of duties noted above). But they
do suggest the range of possible starting points and conclusions if philosophers are
asked to weigh in on the question of extraterritorial duties. Because philosophy asks
the foundational questions common to all questions of extraterritorial duties, its
theories as to whether a state has a duty act abroad in the ﬁrst place can tell us a
great deal about what duties it might have when it acts abroad. Their views will turn
on the reasons whether we owe any duties beyond our own borders and why; and
the implications of those duties for states operating in an interstate system. Goodin
and Miller in particular seem to oﬀer the most to this conversation, although their
distinction between positive duties and negative duties is really more of a hunch on
their part than a well thought-out argument. Further work on this subject is clearly
needed, and that thinking can contribute to our understanding of which sorts of human rights trigger territorial duties; which trigger extraterritorial ones; what those
duties are—to respect, protect, or fulﬁll; and who must bear them in a world where
there may be multiple duty-bearers but none willing to carry out the duty.
More generally, the above discussion highlights the need for those in law and philosophy to consider broader linkages and ramiﬁcations for their work. Lawyers have
addressed the issue of extraterritorial application of human rights from a perspective
that misses its key connections with subjects such as the responsibility to protect
or humanitarian intervention, the latter of which are relegated to another subject
area (notably jus ad bellum). Recourse to philosophical concepts of duties makes this
linkage apparent. Philosophers, on the other hand, have only considered half of the
ramiﬁcations of their theorizing about general vs. special duties, leaving out a signiﬁcant set of problems that arise when a state decides to act abroad even when it does
not have a duty to do so. In a word, international law has examined the two sides of
the problem without seeing it as one problem, while philosophy identiﬁes a broad
problem but has only chosen to focus on one side of it.
V. Conclusion
More than any other method of international law, the policy-oriented school has
proved itself open to numerous interdisciplinary insights—without being formally
anchored to a coordinate discipline as is the case with law and economics. Yet the
New Haven School has always seen the social sciences, with their rich empiricism,
as its closest kin. This paper has suggested that an alternative set of disciplines, political and moral philosophy, oﬀer new critical insights for policy-oriented lawyers.
Whether in scrutinizing his or her own observational standpoint, understanding the
perspectives of others, or prescribing for the future, the policy-oriented international
lawyer cannot ignore the fundamental moral questions about interpersonal and interstate duties at the heart of the project of international justice.
The upshot is a need for direct collaboration among legal scholars and philosophers to understand the comparative advantage oﬀered by the others. For the present, the lawyers oﬀer the base of knowledge of the process of international lawmak-
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ing, the substance of current norms, and the role of international institutions in
formulating and implementing norms. Political scientists contribute a thick description of the international actors as well. The philosophers, however, question some of
the basic assumptions of lawyers with analytic rigor. Is there really an international
community? Why? What sorts of duties ﬂow from diﬀerent visions of that community? Why might we want diversity or unity with respect to questions of governance?
Lawyers implicitly consider these questions in their attempts to build structures of
global order, but as the example of extraterritorial duties demonstrates, the explicit
consideration of these issues can greatly contribute to more nuanced and careful
policymaking.
At the same time, the philosopher’s questions can only be part of the project of
constructing a just world order, for philosophers need to gain a far greater awareness
of the workings of the international process. This requires a deeper understanding
of the norms and institutions of international law. In learning about the extant legal
order, philosophers often quick to criticize it may recognize that certain elements are
indeed morally justiﬁable and that proposals for reconstruction need to take account
of these possible justiﬁcations.69 For those interested in actually achieving international justice rather than simply elucidating its ideal contours, the result of this collaboration will be to make their work more relevant and convincing to the public and
policy audiences who in the end must implement it.
The New Haven School oﬀers particularly fertile scholarship for that collaboration, for its avoidance of dry and decontextualized doctrine in favor of nuanced appraisal will best aid the philosopher seeking to understand the contours of the legal
landscape. Its attention to both myth system and operational code, the conditional
factors behind existing rules, and the shortcoming of the status quo to address current challenges to public order have much to oﬀer those engaged in ethics. Traditional positivist scholarship has its place as well, but those in ethics engaged in global
justice would clearly gain special insights into international law from reading the
works of Reisman, Higgins, and others not afraid of context and policy.
The results of such a process of collaboration for international law remain to be
seen. It may be that, in the end, lawyers will retreat to the practicalities—ﬁnancially
driven and otherwise—of their profession and conclude that their role is to solve
problems quickly and realistically. From such a perspective, even non-ideal theory in
philosophy is simply too many steps removed from the rough-and-tumble political
process of convincing state and nonstate actors to prescribe or implement a certain
vision of the law. But such a rejection of the moral questions is likely to be successful
for the lawyer only in the short term. As the New Haven School recognizes, even the
most practical solution devised by the lawyer will still need to be sold to a various
audiences, domestic and global, and for many of them moral argumentation—even
if not at the level of abstraction of the philosopher—still holds great sway. For those
targets of projected policies will want to hear not simply that the lawyer’s solution
69
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works, but that it is right. For the lawyer to have considered those questions at the
beginning of his or her task rather than at the end can only help in developing new
norms and institutions to address the most pressing of global issues.
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